The Soft Power Paradox

Abstract

As it approaches its 80th anniversary, the Marshall Plan remains an enigma. Why did such a successful plan remain an exception to the rule? This study reveals a paradox: soft power strategies depend on some superpower (hard power) possessing the financial capacity and the power to coordinate public policies necessary to promote minimally benevolent development policies beyond its own borders, while at the same time confronting corporate interests oriented exclusively toward the short term.

Introduction

The central problem of this article is to understand why the Marshall Plan was, and continues to be, an exception to the rule, restricted to only part of post-World War II Europe and never replicated, on a comparable scale, at other times or on other continents. Why did the Plan constitute an exception, in terms of soft power, to the predominant rule of United States foreign policy, historically marked by the predominance of the so-called hawks (advocates of war and interventionism) at the expense of the doves (advocates of restraint, cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts)?